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S
ynthetic biology has emerged as an 
exciting and promising new research 
field, garnering significant attention 
from both the scientific community and the 
general public. This interest results from a 
variety of striking features: synthetic biology 
is a truly interdisciplinary field that engages 
biologists, mathematicians, physicists and 
engineers; its research focus is applied; 
and it has enormous potential to harness 
the power of biology to provide scientific 
and engineering solutions to a wide range 
of problems and challenges that plague 
humanity. However, the power of synthetic 
biology to engineer organisms with custom-
made functionality requires that researchers   
and society use this power safely and 
responsibly, in particular when it comes to 
releasing organisms into the environment. 
This creates new challenges for both the 
design of such organisms and the regulatory 
process governing their   creation and use.
As synthetic biology is being defined 
and developed by researchers spanning 
several fields, it is hardly surprising that a 
unified   definition of synthetic biology is 
lacking. For the purposes of this paper, we 
define synthetic biology as ‘the endeavour 
to design new, or modify existing, organ-
isms to produce biological   systems with 
new or enhanced functionality according 
to quantifiable design criteria’, because 
it explicitly requires that the synthetic 
system   can be evaluated against a quanti-
fiable design objective as is done in   
traditional engineering.
T
he origins of synthetic biology go 
back to 1979, when the Nobel 
Prize-winning chemist Har Gobind 
Khorana synthesized a 207 base-pair DNA 
sequence [1]. Since that breakthrough, the 
size and complexity of synthetic DNA mol-
ecules has rapidly increased, culminating 
in 2010 with the successful synthesis of the 
1.08 Mbp  Mycoplasma mycoides genome, 
which is capable of self-replication [2]. 
This breakthrough prompted US President 
Barack Obama to commission a report on 
the safety implications of synthetic biol-
ogy. In December 2010, the Presidential 
Commission for the Study of Bioethical 
Issues (PCSBI) reported to the White House 
and “found no reason to endorse fur-
ther federal regulations or a moratorium 
to work in this field at this time” [3]. The 
report recommended that scientists should 
regulate themselves and pointed out the 
need for “scientific, religious and civic 
engagement with the public”. Such recom-
mendations, especially in regard to public 
engagement, had already been made by the 
main UK funding bodies: the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC), the Biotechnology and Biological 
Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), the 
Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council (AHRC).
The rationale for such studies and 
reports is the enormous potential of syn-
thetic biology to develop new biological 
organisms capable of carrying out func-
tions useful to industry and society, such 
as waste degradation, water toxicity detec-
tion, biofuel production, drug development   
and so on. Many of the applications   
of synthetic biology ultimately involve   
the release of synthetic organisms into the 
environment. In addition to raising social 
and ethical issues, this creates major sci-
entific and engineering challenges, in 
particular the need to design robust and 
predictable synthetic organisms. Thus, until 
we are capable of constructing synthetic 
organisms that meet strictly defined design 
criteria—in which future behaviour is pre-
dictable in the presence of intrinsic and 
extrinsic noise, uncertainty and evolution-
ary action—scientists and society should 
exercise caution before synthetic organ-
isms are allowed to leave the confines of 
the laboratory. Robustness requirements, 
such as these, need to be incorporated into 
the synthetic biology research cycle as is 
common practice   in other engineering   
disciplines (Fig 1).
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T
echnological systems of staggering 
complexity, such as digital comput-
ers, power grids and the Internet, have 
become such an integral part of our lives that 
we take them for granted. Their success owes, 
in large measure, to the modular design strat-
egy that engineers use to deal with escalating 
levels of complexity and conflicting require-
ments. A large system is typically designed by 
using a ‘top-down’ approach: the problem is 
divided into a hierarchical set of smaller sub-
problems for which it is easier to design and 
implement smaller subsystems using existing 
and well-characterized modules that solve 
these sub-problems. The task is complete 
when the overall design has been success-
fully tested and verified, to guarantee that the 
system performs according to the specifica-
tions to which it was designed. If the design 
is not modular and hierarchical,   verification 
rapidly   becomes intractable.
Unfortunately, it is not always clear what 
constitutes a module in biological systems, 
nor how modules can be interconnected. 
One way to define a modular structure in 
natural genetic circuits is through ‘network 
motifs’, interaction patterns that occur 
frequently in complex networks and that 
could be associated with particular func-
tionalities. Such motifs can range in scale 
from localized bimolecular interactions to 
complete pathways, such as linear cascades 
or coherent and incoherent feed-forward 
loops. Although various algorithms have 
been developed to identify such motifs 
in protein–protein and genetic networks   
in  Escherichia  coli and Saccharomyces   
cerevisiae [4], the relationship between net-
work motifs and the dynamic functionality 
of the whole network is still unclear. This 
conceptual gap needs to be resolved if we 
are to use natural modules systematically to 
redesign predictable and robust synthetic 
organisms. It is therefore not surprising 
that the first synthetic systems used sim-
pler configurations, rather than adaptations 
of more complex biological networks, to 
achieve a particular functionality. Instead, 
those constructions were based on classical 
engineering   design principles (Table 1).
Part of the success of synthetic biology to 
date has depended on a measure of modu-
larity, through the creation of a standard 
library of parts, that enables a ‘plug-and-
play’ framework for biological circuits. The 
idea is to develop a library of standardized 
genetic modules with specific functionality 
that can be combined to achieve a certain 
function, analogous to binary transistor 
logic libraries used by electrical engineers. 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Registry of Standard Biological Parts 
is, at the time of writing, the most popular 
example (http://partsregistry.org/).
Although the ‘second wave of synthetic 
biology’ [5] now focuses on the inter-
connections of such modules, the issue of 
modularity is still open to debate [6]. The 
question is whether modularity is a natu-
ral property, or whether it is an abstraction 
imposed by engineers to simplify the design 
of complex systems. One school of thought 
asserts that abstraction should be enforced 
in synthetic designs to achieve scalability, 
predictability and robustness. The oppos-
ing view contends that dictating that all 
synthetic biology designs must be modu-
lar, can lead to unworkable constructs and 
  significantly restricts the design options.
A
t the other end of the spectrum, 
engineers must make sure that 
their designs are ‘robust’ to noise 
and perturbations, or, put another way, 
can operate   in the presence of uncertainty. 
Such robustness is achieved, often at great 
cost, typically through the use of feedback 
loops [7]. However, making a system robust 
to a particular set of perturbations can make 
it fragile to other perturbations, which 
results in ‘robust yet fragile’ behaviour [8]. 
If the designer is aware of this constraint, he 
or she can ensure that overall fragilities are 
rare. A commercial airliner for instance has 
been designed to be robust to perturbations 
such as cargo load variation, atmospheric   
changes or ageing material. Each of these 
perturbations occur over different but 
known spatial and temporal timescales. 
However, unanticipated microscopic dam-
age to a few core processors on board could 
have catastrophic consequences.
In the context of synthetic biology, the 
balance between robustness and fragil-
ity is extremely important. Consider as an 
example the case of a synthetic biosen-
sor to detect land mines [9]. Researchers 
would have to create designs and describe 
various biochemical reactions and the 
organism’s interactions with the desired 
target. However, only a finite number of 
probable interactions can realistically be 
modelled. Furthermore, each interaction 
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can be modelled only with respect to a few 
parameters, such as temperature, pH levels, 
kinetic constants, evolutionary fitness and 
so on. Assuming the constructed organism 
satisfies all the design criteria and is robust 
to the uncertainty just described, is it rea-
sonable to release it into the field? Clearly, 
the job of detecting land mines is a worthy 
cause; however, there are probably many 
other factors that the biosensor encounters 
that have not been modelled or accounted 
for, or for which the parameters considered 
during   the modelling phase are not valid.
Simple organisms use feedback to 
achieve such robustness—the classic exam-
ple is chemotaxis in E. coli [10]. Robustness 
applied to synthetic biology should ensure 
that the dynamic behaviour of the engi-
neered organism is not sensitive to ‘small’ 
expected fluctuations in the environment in 
which it operates. However, one of the fun-
damental challenges for synthetic biology 
is to account for the uncertain environment 
that the synthetic organism might eventu-
ally inhabit. This uncertainty is caused by 
a variety of factors—high levels of noise, 
adaptation and evolution at the organism 
and population levels, and uncharacter-
ized cross-talk between modules—and is 
fundamentally different from that typically 
accounted for in engineering.
A 
systems engineering approach to 
synthetic biology advocates a sepa-
ration of the design into two distinct 
layers: the design of individual components 
or modules to create the desired functional-
ity, and the design of their interconnection 
structure and communication mechanisms. 
Two key issues under debate are whether 
natural systems can be interpreted as 
hierarchically organized modules, and 
conversely, to what extent synthetic bio-
logists can learn from the interconnection 
architecture   of natural systems (Table 1).
These two questions lead naturally to 
the overlap between synthetic and systems 
biology. The latter studies the organiza-
tional structure of natural systems to derive 
simplified models, by using assumptions 
such as modularity and hierarchical layer-
ing. Indeed, there are similarities between 
natural and man-made complex systems 
in terms of their organizational structure, 
as illustrated in [11] by using a Lego brick 
analogy. However, despite these appar-
ent organizational similarities, some of the 
defining properties of biological systems, 
such as their natural ability to evolve, raise 
fundamental theoretical challenges.
A main obstacle to designing predict-
able and robust biological circuits, is the 
requirement for exact input–output proper-
ties of modules both in isolation and when 
interconnected. Many of the synthetic parts 
in the MIT registry are poorly characterized   
in regard to their dynamic behaviour in 
isolation   and under varying biological envi-
ronments. This is in part caused by a lack of 
knowledge about the environmental vari-
ables that can affect biological behaviour. 
In a classical engineering set-up, a sufficient 
description for a module would involve a 
predictable input–output behaviour, char-
acterized by parameters that can be varied 
to suit key properties—such as operating 
temperature, pressure, energy source and so 
on—that define the state of the environment 
in which the module is to operate. In bio-
logical design, many of the environmental 
properties that determine the behaviour of 
a module have not been identified, or have 
been identified but not modelled owing to 
their complexity.
Even if we assume that a module is fully 
characterized in isolation, there are further 
challenges related directly to our ability 
to predict the behaviour of an ensemble 
of interconnected modules. One such 
obstacle is ‘retroactivity’—feedback from 
downstream events and elements that typi-
cally propagates information in a direction 
opposite to that which is normally antici-
pated [12]. Such effects are relevant because 
any useful synthetic organism is probably 
formed from multiple interconnected mod-
ules. From an engineering perspective, each 
module is designed so that retroactivity is 
attenuated around the desired operating 
point of the system. An example of retro-
activity is a cascade of hydraulic tanks: 
when water flows from an upstream tank to   
a downstream tank, the water pressure in 
the upstream tank changes. The result is 
a flow of information in both directions 
although the input to output behaviour 
acts only downstream. Retroactivity in cel-
lular biology appears when an upstream 
promoter experiences feedback from the 
activation of downstream promoters, as 
observed experimentally in the nitrogen 
assimilation control system of E. coli [13]. 
It has been shown, however, that long 
phosphorylation and dephos  phorylation 
cascades can signifi  cantly attenuate retro-
activity [14]. Thus, one possible solution 
could be to incorporate these cascades into 
synthetic constructs to increase the level of 
modularity of the designed system.
A
nother difficulty for designing pre-
dictable behaviour in inter  connected 
modules is the fact that different 
connected modules might have varying 
sensitivity to the intra- and intercellular   
environment. Consider, for example, a syn-
thetic organism that is designed for waste 
degradation [15] and assume that such an 
organism comprises several modules. In 
addition to the differing sensitivity of the 
connected modules to intra and intercellular 
environments under laboratory conditions, 
the variable and uncertain environment in 
which they are to be released will push the 
operation of the engineered organism to its 
robustness limit. With respect to waste deg-
radation, this potential lack of robustness is a 
severe problem, as a population of synthetic 
organisms would need to be sustained to be 
effective. Unique to this example is the fact 
that once the synthetic organism—which for 
the sake of argument we shall say is ‘robust’—
has achieved its goal, it might not be desir-
able to continue the synthetic population. An 
overly robust organism might even become 
problematic unless we can control where 
the ‘fragility’ occurs and use this as a form of 
population control. By maintaining this line 
of thought it might be possible to specifically 
Table 1 | Engineering, natural and synthetic solutions for designing complex systems
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engineer fragility in such a manner that the 
synthetic organisms are ‘evolutionary losers’. 
When the synthetic   organisms are released 
into the open environ  ment they will be out-
competed by their natural counterpart and   
eventually die off.
Another solution to address intra- and 
intercellular sensitivity is to design ‘ortho-
gonal’ modules that do not interfere with 
each other. Recent work [16] created a syn-
thetic pathway in E. coli on the basis of the 
idea of transcription and translation mecha-
nisms that are orthogonal to those naturally 
present   in the bacterial host cell.
A theoretical approach for designing a 
controllable synthetic circuit has been pro-
posed [17,18] and could be applied in similar 
situations. The principal idea is to incorporate 
an outer feedback loop around the synthetic 
construct, such that the organism cannot be 
sustained without an external control signal: 
a given nutrient or a light source. This type 
of approach guarantees that the engineered 
organism cannot survive unaided in the   
environment and will eventually die off 
when the control signal is no longer applied 
(Fig 2). However, the predictability of evolu-
tion and adaptation of synthetic organisms is 
limited. Indeed, population-level dynamical 
adaptation, noise during gene expression   
and continuing reproduction need to be 
taken into account both at the design stage 
and as part of the experimental verification.
Biological systems are subject to high 
levels of both extrinsic noise and intrinsic 
stochasticity, owing to low copy numbers 
of DNA and mRNA [19]. Typically, feed-
back loops are used to attenuate the effects 
of noise. However, the level of noise in 
natural organisms far exceeds that of man-
made systems. Furthermore, cells are able 
to use noise as a signalling mechanism. 
Contrary to typical engineering designs, 
biology exploits unavoidable variability to 
ensure robustness and adaptation to chang-
ing environments. Therefore, a synthetic 
design principle can either be to construct 
modules that are robust to noise or to 
explicitly use the stochastic nature of the 
cellular environment in the design process. 
In the former case, recent work [20] has 
addressed the fundamental limits of sup-
pressing molecular fluctuation as a function 
of the signalling rate. Synthetic circuits 
might therefore require a hybrid solution 
that incorporates both design principles.
O
ne of the most challenging 
aspects of synthetic biology is 
the engineering of evolution. The 
possibility that a designed biological com-
ponent might in future generations cease 
to exist or, worse yet, might mutate into 
something different raises important ethi-
cal and practical questions. Evolution and 
mutation do not fit into any of the existing 
theoretical frameworks for robustness or 
modelling, although work in this direction 
has already begun both experimentally [21] 
and theoretically [22]. In the former case, 
randomized non-essential sequences were   
inserted into DNA sequences that code 
for a simple feed-forward loop. The result-
ing synthetic constructs still meet the 
design criteria, although the non-essential 
sequences were shown to have an effect on 
dynamic functionality. In the latter work, 
the authors developed a dynamic model 
that accounts for the adaptive behaviour 
seen in E. coli that fits with general evolu-
tionary principles. From a conceptual point 
of view it might be helpful to think of evo-
lution, mutation and adaptation as a type 
of discrete uncertainty, in a mathematical 
sense, that affects the long-term dynamics 
of a synthetic organism. In comparison,   
intrinsic and extrinsic noise could be 
viewed as short-term continuous effects.
In almost all natural cells, the genetic 
code contains redundant or at least non-
coding sequences termed ‘junk DNA’. 
In many cases, junk DNA contains 
transposons that cause mutations and genes 
whose function is unknown—possible relics 
from previous evolutionary steps. In keep-
ing with the ‘minimal genome’ hypothesis, 
previous work developed an E. coli genome 
with much of this junk DNA removed [23]. 
It showed that the synthesized bacteria had 
exactly the same growth rate properties as 
the wild type. In theory, minimal genome 
organisms should also reduce the risk of 
mutation and evolution and provide a solid 
basis for enforcing modularity and minimal 
designs in synthetic biology.
It is vital that future design frameworks 
consider evolution, to ensure that synthetic 
organisms behave as predicted over longer 
timescales, and are thus compliant from a 
biosafety standpoint. In terms of moving 
synthetic biology from the lab to real world 
applications it is perhaps this challenge that 
most needs a solution.
F
rom an industrial perspective,   
efficiency usually means yield 
maximization or minimal resource   
utilization. From a biological perspective, 
this utilitarian perspective—in an economi-
cal and mathe  matical sense—does not 
share the same objective as natural evolu-
tion. Natural biochemical pathways are 
optimized through evolution for their ability 
to adapt and not necessarily for a particular 
function, as is typically required for indus-
trial applications. In addition, pathways often 
carry an evolutionary burden. Thus, design 
for industrial applications cannot borrow 
blindly from natural biochemical pathways. 
It is notable that robustness in the context 
of industrial applications does not have the 
In vivo or in silico experiment
Control action
m1
+3
p1
0
m2
0
p2
0
Control design
State estimation
m1
9
p1
90
m2
0
p2
5
Fig 2 | Conceptual idea of incorporating a feedback signal to sustain a synthetic population.
One of the most challenging 
aspects of synthetic biology is 
the engineering of evolutionEMBO reports  VOL 13 | NO 7 | 2012 ©2012 EUROPEAN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORGANIZATION 588  
science & society The engineering and ethics of synthetic biology
same meaning as robustness with respect to 
environ  mental release. For example, biofuel 
production [24] typically takes place in an 
industrial reactor, and the primary robustness 
issue is to maximize the fuel yield in the pres-
ence of varying food quality. In this example, 
the synthetic organisms do not interact with 
the environment in the same way as do syn-
thetic organisms designed for other tasks, 
hence the importance of robustness   to that 
uncertainty is not as high.
Some of the most challenging problems 
for optimizing synthetic biology applications 
are those that try to blend network topology 
optimization with network flux optimiza-
tion. Work towards this goal is described 
in  [25], in which pathway optimization 
is carried out on a case-by-case basis. At 
the other end of the spectrum, the authors 
in [26] explicitly take into account optimiza-
tion through pathway evolution, in a general 
mathematical and computational frame-
work. Both approaches promise interesting   
and diverse solution strategies.
I
n spite of these fundamentally diffi-
cult engineering challenges, there have 
been several industrial-scale success 
stories. For example, the modification   of 
natural biochemical pathways has been 
used for the production of heterologous 
proteins [25]. Similar applications for waste 
degradation  [15] and biofuels  [27] are 
under develop  ment. One of the biggest suc-
cesses so far has come from Jay Keasling’s 
lab at the University of California, Berkley, 
USA, which focuses on improving the 
production of the anti-malarial drug arte-
misinin [28]. The plant gene amorphadiene   
synthase (ADS) was introduced into a 
re-engineered native biochemical path-
way of S.  cerevisiae to achieve a high 
yield of artemisinin with low resource 
consumption. The promise to provide a 
cheap anti-malarial drug in developing   
nations constitutes a significant step in 
demonstrat  ing the benefits of synthetic   
biology, to a potentially sceptical public.
From an environmental perspective, 
metabolic engineering has been successful 
in producing polylactic acid (PLA). PLA 
is a thermoplastic with many favourable 
properties: it is biodegradable, biocom-
patible and has low toxicity for humans. 
Furthermore, it is synthesized from renew-
able resources such as starch and sugar 
cane. Recent work  [29] followed a full 
synthetic biology design cycle, including 
computational analysis and full genome-
wide flux analysis, to develop a metabolic 
pathway that was inserted into E.  coli. 
The authors knocked out unnecessary 
genes and were able to achieve an 11wt% 
increase in PLA synthesis from glucose, and 
up to 56wt% increase in its copoly  mers. As 
with artemisinin, these industrial examples 
offer much needed solutions to major soci-
etal challenges, and are a key ingredient in 
the necessary   public engagement.
Slightly outside our definition of synthetic 
biology, another industrial scale success took 
place in 2010. The Cayman Islands Mosquito 
Research and Control Unit in collabora-
tion with Oxitec announced the results of 
a large field trial, during which approxi-
mately 3 million genetically modified (GM) 
mosquitos were released with the objective 
of reducing the population of the mosquito   
Aedes aegypti, a vector of the dengue 
virus. In this instance the A. aegypti popu-
lation dropped by 80% [30]. The approach 
involved the ‘sterile insect technique’ [31] 
and a method from molecular biology 
known as ‘release of insects   carrying a domi-
nant lethal’ (RIDL) to ensure the synthetic 
population died out over time [32].
T
he ability to create synthetic organ-
isms, combined with our inability to 
control them with solid guarantees, 
raises the need to consider the ethical impli-
cations. Many of these issues are not new 
and have been addressed in many areas of 
life science research. We therefore particu-
larly address the ethical considerations that 
relate to the introduction of synthetic organ-
isms to the environment and describe a 
possible   decision-making framework.
Among the most commonly raised 
ethical issues are those focusing on the 
potential for synthetic biologists to create 
life or concerns about ‘playing God’ [33]. 
Counterarguments specific to synthetic 
biology have been made by Douglas and 
Savulescu [34]. Another primary con-
cern focuses on the fact that reductionist   
approaches to synthetic biology might 
erode the distinction between organisms 
and machines. Further issues concern 
the moral status of synthetic organisms in 
  relation to natural living organisms and 
  non-living matter [35].
However, in our view, the ethical issues 
that most warrant consideration relate to the 
possible risks of releasing synthetic entities 
into the environment, given that predicting 
their future behaviour is a challenging task. 
Whilst this should motivate synthetic biolo-
gists to improve design techniques, ethical 
analysis might help determine what level of 
predictability should be required, and how 
the possible risks should be weighed against 
probable benefits.
It is of paramount importance that designs 
should behave and evolve in a predictable 
manner. However, achieving perfect predict-
ability and controllability is difficult. Thus, 
it is important to determine what risks are 
acceptable for releasing synthetic organisms 
into the environment.
O
ne approach to deal with risk has 
been the precautionary principle, 
which has been used in areas as 
diverse as climate change, ozone depletion, 
nanotechnology and GM crops. There are 
differing formulations of the precautionary 
principle [36,37], but a theme common to 
many of these is that one should exercise 
caution, or even refrain from specific poli-
cies or actions, when the risks of a major 
catastrophe are present, even if very low. 
Such approaches are intended to draw 
attention to the deficiencies of standard 
decision theory when applied to events with 
very low probability.
A notable problem with the precau-
tionary principle is that it seems to be 
inappropri  ately insensitive to the benefits 
of a course of action, or, put another way, 
to the risks of inaction [37,38]. Suppose 
that releasing a synthetic organism into the 
environment poses a significant but very low 
risk of serious ecological disruption, but it 
is almost certain to have marked benefits, 
such as curing   a common and lethal disease, 
eliminating famine or substantially mitigat-
ing climate change. Strong variants of the 
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precautionary principle recommend against 
releasing this organism on the basis that 
there is a significant risk of a seriously bad 
outcome, but this seems an overly cautious 
approach. In this case, the benefits of releas-
ing seem to outweigh the risks—indeed, the 
benefits include the elimination or mitigation  
of even more serious and certain risks.
I
n response to this and other problems 
faced by the precautionary principle, 
the concept of ‘reasonable risk’ has 
been proposed. In the context of releasing 
new organisms into the environment, the 
following factors are relevant for determin-
ing whether the risks are reasonable [39]. 
Is there a known direct risk to the welfare 
of sentient beings before releasing the new 
organism? What is its magnitude, based on 
evidence available at the time? Should any 
non-human, non-biological or epidemio-
logical research, systematic overview or 
computer modelling have been performed 
before the study to better estimate the risk to 
sentient beings? Could the risk be reduced? 
Is it as small as possible? Are the potential 
benefits of this study worth the risks? Are 
there indirect risks to the welfare of sentient 
beings? For example, could the organism be 
captured, altered and used for destructive 
purposes by a malevolent agent?
Each of these points should be addressed 
before releasing a synthetic organism into 
the environment. There are further questions 
about how these considerations should be 
weighed against each another. However, it is 
possible to make some schematic comments 
about this approach. For example, the level 
of robustness to unmodelled interactions and 
evolution, which must be engineered into a 
synthetic organism before release, depends 
on its intended location. Thus, minimum 
robustness needs to be considerably higher 
for organisms intended for release into the 
general environment than for organisms that 
are to be used in tightly controlled industrial   
settings. The level of minimum robustness 
required also depends on the probable   
benefits of the organism. A less stringent 
robustness guarantee would be required of 
organisms that would, for example, mar-
ginally increase the efficiency of highly 
specialized industrial processes that prob-
ably take place in a controlled industrial lab 
environment   than of organisms that might 
substantially mitigate major global threats 
and must be released into the environment.
There are also further questions about 
who should be charged with applying the 
‘reasonable risk’ framework: national-level 
professional bodies, individual research 
institutions and scientists, or companies? 
There might be good reasons for vesting the 
ultimate responsibility of decision-making 
in an international body. The constituent 
members of such a group would ideally 
include leading scientists in the field of 
synthetic biology in addition to an ethical, 
industrial and governmental component. 
First, this would help to avoid duplication 
of work and confer economies of scale. 
Second, given that the release of new organ-
isms into the environment could have signif-
icant consequences for everyone, basic 
democratic principles would dictate that 
such a body should represent the interests of 
all. Third, releasing a new organism into the 
environment can have irreversible effects. If 
individual institutions separately assessed 
the reasonableness of risks and act on their 
own assessments, it would take only one 
institution to underestimate the risks in 
order for irreversible harm to be done.
A
s synthetic biology touches on many 
sensitive ethical questions, a dialogue 
between scientists, industry and the 
public is paramount to prevent misunder-
standings about research. One example is 
the debate about GM food in the UK. It was 
primarily a communication issue that ended 
GM food production in the UK. As noted 
in  [40], although members of the public 
are happy to take recombinant-DNA-based 
drugs such as insulin or interferon, foods with 
even trace amounts of recombinant DNA are 
viewed as highly offensive.
Researchers in synthetic biology need 
to explain the huge impact that the field 
might have on medicine and industry. 
Public concerns   about safety and the abil-
ity of responsible self-regulation must be 
addressed   [41]. If researchers are willing 
to show that measures such as decreased 
population fitness are being considered, and 
applied, then this can only help increase 
trust in synthetic biologists by the public. 
Ultimately, it is the dialogue between the 
research community and the public that can 
pave the way for acceptance of synthetic 
biology. This is only possible if communic-
ation between research communities, and 
the public, is established from the very 
beginning. In addition, industry can be valu-
able by drafting a code of practice and  setting 
standards for biosafety and biosecurity.
Synthetic biologists have already 
taken a proactive attitude by collaborat-
ing with social scientists and engaging with   
the public from the outset. For example, the 
four Research Councils in the UK (BBSRC, 
EPSRC, ESRC and AHRC) have created and 
jointly funded seven research networks that 
include researchers interested in the ‘ethi-
cal, legal and social implications’ (ELSI) of 
synthetic biology. These networks encourage 
regular meetings of synthetic biologists and 
ELSI researchers, informing both sides about 
technological and ELSI progress. Moreover, 
public engagement meetings that should 
ensure the correct interpretation of the   
biotechnological achievements, and future 
public acceptance, are strongly encouraged. 
The public should be informed, in particular, 
that synthetic biologists adequately take care 
of biosafety arrangements and, in so doing, 
allow the field to regulate itself [3]. To this 
end, the European Commission initiated 
the SYNBIOSAFE consortium (http://www.
synbiosafe.eu/) focusing on the discussion 
of biosafety and ethical concerns, and facili-
tating a socially acceptable development in 
all related fields. Most importantly, however, 
scientists working in synthetic biology must 
effectively communicate and maintain an 
open dialogue with the public as the future 
of the field also depends on public approval. 
Synthetic biologists and ELSI experts should 
analyse these issues and offer well-informed 
governance recommendations.
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